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INTRODUCTION
In the last two decades, seismic shifts have transformed the inter-
national order underlying economic and political relations as well as
the central regimes of international economic law. These shifts are
quite visible in the posture of the international order on development
issues. Substantively, the order has moved away from a relative ac-
ceptance of "special and differential treatment" for developing coun-
tries, and towards a relative intolerance of that principle. While in-
stitutionally, the order has moved away from "pragmatism" and
towards "legalism," the West may well have gained leverage in its
relationship with the South. Most recently and strikingly, there has
been renewed effort to coordinate the central international trade and
monetary regimes, the World Trade Organization ("WTO") and the
International Monetary Fund ("IMF"). This renewal revives the early
postwar vision of close cooperation between international trade and
monetary organizations-a vision that had faded over the intervening
decades.'
The international law governing balance-of-payments crises in de-
veloping countries reflects both the substantive and the institutional
dynamics at play in this transformation. This has been nowhere more
clearly demonstrated than by the World Trade Organization's recent
resolution of a claim brought by the United States against India, in
which the U.S. asserted that trade restrictions maintained by India for
balance-of-payments purposes were inconsistent with India's WTO
obligations.
Part I of this Article briefly describes the causes of balance-of-
payments crises, drawing on the example of the 1997 Thai crisis and
describing some of the relevant factors for India.2 Part II discusses
the substantive and institutional dimensions of international eco-
* Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. Thanks to
Cynthia Lichtenstein and Tim Canova for their comments on earlier drafts.
1. See generally John H. Jackson, Managing the Trading System: The World
Trade Organization and the Post-Uruguay Round GA TT Agenda, in MANAGING
THE WORLD ECONOMY: FIRST 50 YEARS AFTER BRETTON WOODS 131, 141-43
(Peter B. Kenan ed., 1994) (observing the "lack of coherence" between trade and
monetary regimes to be an "important defect" of the international economic order
prior to the establishment of the World Trade Organization).
2. See infra pp. 102-06.
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nomic law governing balance-of-payments crises.3 Part III describes
the backround and disposition of the India - Quantitative Restric-
tions case. 4 Part IV shows how the substantive and institutional
trends described in Part II influenced the outcome of the case.5 Fi-
nally, Part V concludes by voicing a few concerns about these
trends.6
I. CAUSES OF BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS CRISES
The balance-of-payments resides at the crux of development. It
illustrates the intersection of trade and finance and reveals the rela-
tionship of a given economy to the international marketplace. The
reasons for balance-of-payments crises among developing countries
stem from the basic obstacles that they face in trying to become in-
dustrialized, and also illuminate why those difficulties are so en-
trenched.
A nation's balance-of-payments is where its trade and finance
flows converge. The term "balance-of-payments" refers to a "state-
ment showing all of a nation's transactions with the rest of the world
for a given period. It includes purchases and sales of goods, services,
gifts, government transactions, and capital movements."' 7 This de-
scription of economic activity is often divided into the current ac-
count and the capital account. While current account flows consist
primarily of goods and services, 8 capital account flows are flows in
the ownership of foreign and domestic assets (i.e., in foreign-held
domestic assets and domestic-held foreign assets). 9
A "balance-of-payments" problem occurs when a drop in demand
for a country's currency is so steep that it creates downward pressure
3. See infra pp. 106-16.
4. See infra pp. 116-25.
5. See hiffra pp. 125-27.
6. See ilfra p. 127.
7. PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, MACROECONOMICS 398
(14th ed. 1992).
8. See id. (defining current accounts as the part of balance-of-payments that
includes merchandise and services as imports and exports).
9. See DOMINICK SALVATORE, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 453 (5th ed.
1995) (excluding financial reserve assets from the flow).
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on its currency value. The resulting depreciation destabilizes market
transactions and renders citizens unable to purchase everyday neces-
sities. Governments often take measures to counterbalance this
downward pressure, especially if they have committed to maintain-
ing a rigid exchange rate.
There are both traditional and more novel causes of balance-of-
payments crises. A traditional cause of balance-of-payments crises is
a sudden and severe increase in a country's trade deficit.' 0 Such an
increase might occur, for example, if bad weather drastically reduces
production of key export crops and export earnings. Another classic
case is one in which a steep rise in oil prices dramatically increases a
country's import bill. An "oil shock" of this kind occurred in 1990
and 1991 as a result of the Gulf War. I I The Gulf War oil shock was
instrumental in the balance-of-payments crisis experienced by India
in 1990 and 1991.12 Whether the suddenly increased trade deficit is
due to lower export earnings or a higher import bill, it creates the
same effect: a sharp drop in demand for domestic currency relative to
foreign currency.
In recent years, the capital account side has become an increas-
ingly frequent source of balance-of-payments difficulties for devel-
oping countries. A sudden and sharp reduction of foreign invest-
ment- typically short-term portfolio investment-in domestic assets
can also produce a sharp drop in demand for domestic currency rela-
tive to foreign currency, creating the same effect as a rapid rise in the
trade deficit.
Capital and current accounts can work in tandem to create bal-
ance-of-payment difficulties, particularly under a rigid exchange rate
regime. In Thailand during the 1990s, for example, large capital in-
flows created a booming investment sector. This investment sector
10. See ROBERT J. GORDON, MACROECONOMICS 181-83 (8th ed. 2000) (defin-
ing "trade deficit" as "an excess of imports over exports.. .").
11. The recent rise in oil prices, although not as sudden, has also been signifi-
cant. See Martha M. Hamilton, Oil Price Passes $30 to Hit 9-year High, WASII.
POST, Feb. 15, 2000, at E l (indicating that oil prices, over the last year, have risen
to their highest since the Gulf War).
12. See The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: India, 1994-1995, at
25 (visited June 8, 2000) <http://store.eiu.com/allcountries.asp> [hereinafter EIU
India] (discussing why India felt a crisis in 1990 and 1991).
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increased demand for imports, particularly capital goods. 13 At the
same time, a government policy of maintaining a strong currency
made exports less competitive and created trade deficits in the mid-
1990s. 14 Finally, increasingly acute concerns about the domestic
banking system caused investors in 1997 to exchange their Thai as-
sets for non-Thai assets en masse."5 The difficulties faced by an over-
leveraged banking system created an investor exodus from Thai
capital markets. While capital flows rushed out and the current ac-
count was in deficit, the government attempted to defend the baht,
which was "essentially pegged to the dollar."" In short, a severe bal-
ance-of-payments crisis struck.
Balance-of-payments difficulties are especially vexing because
they often involve mutually conflicting dynamics - that is, they often
create "catch-22" situations. 17 The traditional balance-of-payments
"catch-22" is the threat of the "downward spiral." Developing-
country governments must maintain a fixed exchange rate in order to
preserve the purchasing power of their citizenry and to prevent "con-
sumption crises" in which sharply depreciated currency prevents
people from purchasing basic necessities. Preserving such an ex-
change rate to prevent consumption crises, however, virtually guar-
antees crises of another sort-those that arise from recurrent de-
mands on governments to maintain the currency value
More recently, the rise of "emerging markets" capital flows have
created an "emerging markets catch-22." Here, the pressure to
13. See Roman Terrill, The Promises and Perils of Globalization: The Asian
Financial Crisis, in Enrique Carrasco, E-Book on International Finance anti De-
velopment, 9 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBs. 275, 284 (1999) (noting the
economic expansion and current account surplus which Thailand previously expe-
rienced).
14. See id. at 285 (commenting on the current account deficits created by in-
creased demand for imports and the dangerous ratio of current account deficits to
Gross Domestic Product).
15. See id. at 286 (asserting that once the Thai economy began to falter, foreign
investors halted and removed the flow of capital into Thailand).
16. See Terrill, supra note 13, at 282.
17. See RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 327 (2d ed.
1987) (defining a "catch-22" as "a frustrating situation in which one is trapped by
contradictory regulations or conditions."). The term derives, of course, from Jo-
seph Heller's eponymous satire of war.
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maintain a stable currency comes not from concern about domestic
purchasing power, but rather from concern about investor confi-
dence. In order to attract the private investment crucial to economic
growth, developing-country governments often feel compelled to
prevent currency fluctuations that are more likely to spark investor
concern in emerging markets. A commitment to maintaining such
currency stability, however, forces the government to take consider-
able measures to prevent fluctuations in currency values.
To prevent downward pressure on the currency from causing such
fluctuations, a government can use both monetary and trade policy.
A government can use monetary policy to increase demand and re-
duce supply of domestic currency by exchanging foreign currency
for domestic currency, ultimately relieving the downward pressure
on currency value. A government can fund these exchanges with its
foreign reserves, or with borrowed money.
In terms of borrowing, the IMF is a crucial source of short-term
funds to correct balance-of-payments difficulties for many develop-
ing countries. In 1997, for example, Thailand borrowed $3.9 billion
U.S. dollars to address its severe balance-of-payments crisis. 18 After
its balance-of-payments crisis of 1990 and 1991, India approached
the IMF and received approval for $2.3 billion U.S. dollars in new
credits. 19
Another possible solution is the use of trade policy to counterbal-
ance the increased demand for imports by imposing import restric-
tions to force a reduction in the trade deficit. These "quantitative re-
strictions" can take any number of forms, from straightforward
import quotas, to restrictive import licensing regimes, and even
health and safety regulations. India first adopted quantitative restric-
tions for balance-of-payments purposes shortly after gaining its inde-
pendence and continued to maintain most of them until the early
1990s. The United States, however, recently challenged its use of
18. See IMF Approves $3.9 Billion Credit Line for Thailand, WALL ST. J., Aug.
21, 1997, at A1O (indicating that other disbursements would follow the original
disbursement of $1.6 billion if the Thai government met the strict requirements of
the IMF).
19. See EIU India, supra note 12, at 56 (explaining India's use of IMF Funds to
solve the balance-of-payments crisis).
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quantitative restrictions before the WTO. The next section will de-
scribe the rules of international economic law that were the subject
of the dispute.
II. INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW ON
BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS CRISES
Following the Second World War, the great powers established a
series of multilateral regimes to secure peace and prosperity." Be-
cause many nations believed global economic liberalization was nec-
essary to accomplish both of these goals, these efforts included the
establishment of organizations governing international trade and
monetary flows. Paramount in these respective categories were the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") and the IMF.
Both organizations established rules relating to balance-of-payments
crises. This section describes those rules and their application.
A. THE TRADE SIDE: THE GATTIWTO
1. The Basic Legal Rules
Article XI of the GATT generally prohibits quantitative restric-
tions on trade.21 Several exceptions, however, loosen this general
prohibition by allowing quantitative restrictions on balance-of-
payments grounds. For example, GATT Article XII allows a party to
impose quantitative restrictions to "safeguard its external financial
position and its balance-of-payments" where such quantitative re-
strictions are necessary either "to forestall the imminent threat of, or
to stop, a serious decline in its monetary reserves" or if the party has
"very low monetary reserves, to achieve a reasonable rate of increase
20. See generally CLAIRE WILCOX, A CHARTER FOR WORLD TRADE (1949).
21. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XI, Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, 224-25 [hereinafter GATT], amtendel
by General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO Agree-
ment], Annex IA, FINAL ACT EMBODYING THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND
OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 21, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1154 (1994) (pro-
viding "[n]o prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges..
. shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting party on the importation of
any product of the territory of any other contracting party...").
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in its reserves. '22
GATT Article XVIII establishes a broader balance-of-payments
exception for developing countries, in recognition of the special dif-
ficulties they face in fending off balance-of-payments crises. Article
XVIII:9 does not require an "imminent" threat, but only "a threat" of
a serious decline in monetary reserves. Alternatively, it requires only
that monetary reserves be "inadequate," as opposed to "very low."
Moreover, whereas Article XII allows the implementation of quanti-
tative restrictions only to "safeguard" the "external financial posi-
tion," Article XVIII:9 recognizes in addition the need "to ensure a
level of reserves adequate for the implementation" of a country's
"programme of economic development. 2 3 Article XVIII: 1 does re-
quire states to "progressively relax ... restrictions ... as conditions
improve, maintaining them only to the extent necessary [under Arti-
cle XVIII:9]." Finally, Article XVIII contains general language rec-
ognizing the tendency of developing countries "to experience bal-
ance-of-payments difficulties arising from efforts to expand their
internal markets as well as from the instability in their terms of
trade."'24 Thus, Article XVIII has traditionally been interpreted as
granting developing-country governments a fair amount of latitude in
imposing trade restrictions for balance-of-payments purposes. 25
In addition to establishing a substantive exception to the rule
against quantitative restrictions, Article XVIII establishes consulta-
tion procedures for supervising the exception. Under these proce-
dures, a party imposing quantitative restrictions under Article XVIII
has to consult with the GATT "as to the nature of its balance of pay-
ment difficulties, alternative corrective measures which may be
available, and the possible effect of the restrictions on the economies
of other contracting parties. ' 26 Article XVIII also authorizes the
22. Id. art. XII.
23. Id. art. XVIII, sec. B, para. 9.
24. Id. art. XVIII sec. B, para. 8.
25. See ROBERT E. HUDEC, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE GATT LEGAL
SYSTEM 27 (Gower, 1987) (asserting that "[s]ince developing countries have an
almost infinite need for additional development resources, [Article XVIII] made it
possible to justify almost any restrictions.").
26. GATT, supra note 21, art. XVIII, sec. B, para. 12(a).
[15:12491256
NEv EcoNAuc ORDER
GATT to conduct periodic reviews of quantitative restrictions in
place for balance-of-payments reasons, and to recommend modifica-
tions for restrictive regimes in order to improve compliance. 27 Fi-
nally, while Article XVIII requires an adversely affected party to
seek consultations with the restricting party, it also authorizes the
GATT to award adversely affected parties compensation by releasing
them from their obligations, as "appropriate," toward the restricting
party.2
8
Drafters have modified the original Article XVIII consultation
procedures several times,29 most importantly in the 1979 Declaration
on Trade Measures Taken for Balance-of-Payment Purposes, 30 and
the Understanding on the Balance-of-Payments Provisions of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994.31 Under these docu-
ments, the Committee on Balance-of-Payments Restrictions is to
conduct Article XVIII consultations. Further, these documents es-
tablish that the membership of the Committee is open to "all con-
tracting parties indicating their wish to serve on it."32 The Committee
27. See id. art. XVIII, sec. B, para. 12(a)-(c) (setting forth an initial review of
all restrictions, establishing an additional review section two years after the origi-
nal session to determine if the restrictions are consistent with previous provisions
in article XVIII or XIII, and advising how inconsistent provisions should be modi-
fied).
28. See id. art. XVIII, sec. B, para. 12(c)(ii) (declaring that the party in viola-
tion of the provisions has to "confor[m] with [the] provisions within a specific pe-
riod of time.").
29. See GATT, ANALYTICAL INDEX: GUIDE TO GATT LAW AND PRAT-icLE
351, 355-56 (6th ed. 1994) (indicating the changes made to the GAIT consultation
procedures, including a "detailed consultation procedure, a simplification of the
procedures for developing countries, and the extension of GATT examination to all
trade measures.").
30. See Declaration on Trade Measures Taken for Balance-of-Payments Pur-
poses, Nov. 28, 1979, GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at 205 (1980) (eliminating the
previously established procedures for examination and establishing that the
"[p]rocedures for examination stipulated in XVIII shall apply to all restrictive im-
port measures taken for balance-of-payments.").
31. See Understanding on the Balance-of-Payments Provisions of the General
Agreements on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15. 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Es-
tablishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA. para. 5, FINAL ACr
EMBODYING THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MLULTILATERAL TRADE
NEGOTIATIONS 21, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1158 (1994) [hereinafter Understanding].
32. Declaration on Trade Measures Taken for Balance-of-Payments Purposes,
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must conduct a periodic review of members' balance-of-payments
restrictions and must report its consultations to the General Council
of the WTO.33 This report should include the Committee's findings
as to whether the balance-of-payments measures are consistent with
Articles XII and XVIII, as well as recommendations aimed at pro-
moting compliance with those provisions. 34 "In the absence of spe-
cific proposals for recommendations by the General Council, the
Committee's conclusions should record the different views expressed
in the Committee. '35
2. The Operation of the Rules
The operation and impact of the rules described above has de-
pended heavily on underlying economic and political norms and re-
lationships. For the most part, developed countries had overcome
their post-war balance-of-payments crises by the 1950s. 36 By the
1970s, developed countries had abandoned maintaining a fully fixed
exchange rate, opting instead for a "managed float."37 The abandon-
ment of a fixed currency value system essentially removed the possi-
bility of immediate balance-of-payments crises. Consequently,
GATT law on balance-of- payments difficulties became largely moot
for the developed world.
For developing countries, by contrast, "the years 1955-60 pro-
duced a growing volume of ever more dramatic studies showing that
Nov. 28, 1979, GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at 207 (1980) [hereinafter Declara-
tion] (establishing committee consultations to "review all restrictive measures
taken for balance-of-payment purposes."); see also Understanding, supra note 3 1,
at 1158 (directing members to discontinue any "restrictive import measures taken
for balance-of-payment purposes.").
33. See Declaration, supra note 32, at 208; see also Understanding, supra note
31, para. 13 (proposing that the recommendations and decisions reached by the
committee should promote the "implementation of Articles XIl and XVIII: B.").
34. See Understanding, supra note 31, para. 13 (concluding that the recom-
mendations should include the facts and reasoning used by the committee to reach
their decision).
35. Id.
36. See HUDEC, supra note 25, at 29.
37. While currencies of the European Monetary Union are now fixed against
each other, they float as a group against other currencies.
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developing countries were losing ground economically." 3S Further,
even though the developing countries' relative economic weaknesses
made them more subject to chronic balance-of-payments difficulties,
they did not abandon fixed exchange rates. Part of the maintenance
of fixed exchange rate regimes came from widely adopted import
substitution policy. In addition, the danger of a "downward spiral,"
forced developing countries into maintaining a fixed exchange rate to
prevent a crisis in purchasing power, even though maintaining such a
rate would guarantee critical demands on foreign reserves.
The chronic nature of balance-of-payments difficulties for devel-
oping countries affected the GATT's administration of Article
XVIII. "Developing countries continued to observe the formalities-
especially in seeking formal waivers for actions not in conformity
with the rules. '39 Developing countries in fact followed the proce-
dures more strictly than developed countries. 40 The situation, how-
ever, was one of "form without substance." 4' The "developing-
country review became increasingly pro formna as their balance-of-
payments problems remained drearily the same." 42
During the 1960s and the 1970s, balance-of-payments consulta-
tions occurred regularly, but rarely resulted in any real constraint on
developing-country governments. This lack of constraint stemmed
from dynamics that are both "substantive," in that they relate to the
content of economic policy; and "institutional," in that they relate to
the role of the GATT in supervising economic policy.
a. Substantive Dynamics
From an economic policy standpoint, the uncontested approval of
the balance-of-payments exemption stemmed from a recognition of
the genuine and chronic difficulties developing countries faced in
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See id. at 31 (observing that the United States and the United Kingdom de-
parted from the rules on balance of payments in the early 1970s without seeking
formal authority from the GATT).
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this area. Those recognizing these difficulties also acknowledged the
"special and differential" status of developing countries. During the
1960s and 1970s, developing-country governments attempted to re-
organize the international economic order around this principle of
preferential treatment for developing countries and sought to estab-
lish a "New International Economic Order. '43
b. Institutional Dynamics
Political trends supporting a relatively lenient approach to the bal-
ance-of-payments exemption also characterized the 1960s and 1970s.
First, developing countries exercised relatively extensive bargaining
power during this period. This influence arose from, among other
things, the leverage non-aligned countries gained from the Cold
War;" and the relative weakness of the industrialized world suffering
from shortages and stagflation. Additionally, sweeping independence
movements and stark examples of collective action such as the oil
price hike, caused by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries ("OPEC"), created the promise of solidarity among "Third
World" nations.45 All of these factors, together with a desire by in-
dustrialized countries to maintain the long-term viability of the
GATT, created an environment of relative receptiveness to the con-
cept of preferential treatment for developing countries.
46
43. See Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Or-
der, G.A. Res. 3201, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/9559
(1974) reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 715 (1974) (asserting that the "[t]he new interna-
tional economic order should be founded on full respect for the following princi-
ples: ...(n) Preferential and non-reciprocal treatment for developing countries,
wherever feasible, in all fields of international economic cooperation whenever
possible."). The foundation for the NIEO movement was the theory of "structural-
ism," which called for a fundamental realignment of the international order to cor-
rect deep imbalances between developed and developing countries that would, if
uncorrected, perpetuate underdevelopment.
44. See JOAN SPERO, THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS
160 (4th ed. 1990) (discussing the value the United States placed on using eco-
nomic assistance to develop southern countries as an important Cold War tool).
45. See id. at 170 (discussing the ability of OPEC member countries to make
demands on wealthier, northern countries).
46. See HUDEC, supra note 25, at 39-70 (observing the preferential treatment
received by developing countries, such as improved market access, tariff prefer-
ences, and the emergence of a more pragmatic system).
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In addition to these factors specific to North-South relations, the
GATT was also entering a phase of "pragmatism." The rise of the
European Economic Community, among other things, supported the
view that countries could apply GATT law in such a way as to be-
come more sensitive to the political issues facing member statesi By
the 1970s, many of those in the GATT community-including its Di-
rector General-expressed expressed distinct disfavor for a "by-the-
book" approach.4
8
Finally, one could interpret the relatively loose application of Arti-
cle XVIII as arising partially out of an institutional decision to leave
scrutiny of balance-of-payments measures to the IMF. The IMF's
structure and focus allowed it a more extensive role in regulating
those aspects of policy that relate to a country's balance-of-payments
situation.
B. THE MONETARY SIDE: THE IMF
During the same years that the GATT was essentially endorsing
balance-of-payments-related import restrictions on developing coun-
tries, the GATT's sister institution in international monetary rela-
tions, the IMF, was crafting an increasingly extensive and authorita-
tive role in supervising developing countries. Originally, the IMF
exerted its regulatory power equally on all members, both industri-
alized and developing alike. The first version of the agreement es-
tablishing the IMF required all members to commit to a "par value"
system to establish values for their currencies in terms of gold or the
U.S. dollar, and maintain their currencies within fairly narrow mar-
gins of those values.49 The agreement authorized deviation from
those margins only "to correct a fundamental disequilibrium," and
47. See id.
48. See OLIVIER LONG, LAW AND ITS LIMITATIONS IN THE GATT
MULTILATERAL TRADE SYSTEM 94-98 (1985) (Director-General of the GATT from
1968-1980) (highlighting the practical enforcement of the GATT and the flexibility
given to developing countries).
49. See Bretton-Woods Agreement, Dec. 27, 1945, art. 4, 60 Stat. 1401, 1403-
04, 2 U.N.T.S. 39, 46 (indicating that specific prices would be set for the "'par
value" system and that the member countries were to promote "exchange stability"
and "maintain orderly exchange arrangements... "').
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only after consultation with the IMF.50 While the IMF never perfectly
enforced the par value system,51 the exigencies of the international
economy caused it to break down altogether in the early 1970s.
52
Consequently, the IMF did not regulate a government's adoption of a
fixed, pegged, or floating exchange rate policy as long as that gov-
ernment complied with the IMF's notification requirements.
If a government sought IMF reserves to aid in addressing a bal-
ance-of-payments crisis, the IMF's policy of conditionality required
that government to demonstrate a commitment to reforms. In the
IMF's opinion, however, these reforms had to be capable of im-
proving the country's "fundamentals" 53 and fostering orderly eco-
nomic and financial institutions.
50. See id. (developing a 10 percent window of alteration from the established
"par value").
51. See JOSEPH GOLD, EXCHANGE RATES: IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
ORGANIZATION 18-19 (1988) (disagreeing, partially, with one commentator's view
that the par value system was ineffective because members at times permitted their
currencies to fluctuate outside the par value margins, and further stating that, de-
spite this fluctuation, the system operated relatively smoothly); see also id. at 19
(observing that "[b]reaches of obligation ... were not frequent ... [iut was not a
period of disorder."). Gold adds that the IMF tolerated many of these deviations.
See id. at 51 (identifying the policy established in 1951 as allowing the "occasional
and exceptional" deviation).
52. See id. at 62 (indicating how the termination of the par value system oc-
curred after the United States withdrew from the system). On August 5, 1971,
President Nixon "closed the gold window," by announcing that the United States
would withdraw its undertaking to purchase and sell gold for United States dollars
freely with other monetary authorities. See id. Nixon also stated that the United
States "would not adopt other appropriate measures to ensure that exchange rates
in exchange transactions involving United States dollars were confined to prede-
termined margins." Id. Despite two subsequent attempts to restructure the par
value system, the system collapsed for good in March 1973, "because it [could] not
withstand the onslaught of speculative movements of funds, which two devalua-
tions of the U.S. dollar did not deter." See Gold, supra note 52, at 62. Schedule C
of the IMF Agreement provides that the IMF can call a par value system into op-
eration under Article IV, Section 4. However, "[n]othing in Schedule C or any
other provision ... suggests that this ... system must be called into operation,
[and] ... [n]othing that has happened since... suggests that members contemplate
calling Schedule C into operation." Id. at 195.
53. See id. at 14 (defining "fundamentals" as "established jargon for such basic
economic factors as prices, incomes, gross national product, trade, investment, and
current account balances, in contrast to purely speculative influences.").
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Thus, in the 1970s, the IMF's role shifted from its early postwar
function as arbiter of the international monetary system, to functions
as lender and adviser to developing countries. This identity shift
arose from the abandonment by industrialized country governments
of fixed exchange rates, and the widespread continuation of fixed or
pegged exchange rate regimes by developing countries. The shift
also arose because developing country governments experienced
chronic balance-of-payments difficulties throughout the 1970s.
The balance-of-payments difficulties of the developing world
came to a head in 1982, when Mexico announced that it would no
longer be able to service its foreign-held debt. By the early 1980s, it
became clear that many developing countries, saddled with debt bur-
dens acquired from commercial and official sources, and plagued by
a worldwide recession, could not pay their debt.
C. THE ERA OF DEEP INTEGRATION
The debt crisis caused commercial banks, governments and inter-
national financial institutions to work more closely in addressing the
problem. Because re-schedulings of all external debt were often tied
to approval by the IMF of a debtor government's economic reform
package, the IMF acquired new influence over the monetary and fi-
nancial polices of debtor governments. The expansion of IMF fund
facilities into "structural adjustment" regimes also arose during this
period.54 Under these facilities, governments had access to funds
over a longer period in exchange for demonstrated commitment to a
host of reforms, including raising interest rates, increasing taxes,
lifting price controls, and curbing public expenditures. Governments
also had to commit to deeper, "structural" reforms with respect to the
privatization of state-owned industries and the opening up of foreign
trade and investment.
The debt crisis and the "strong incentives for policy change" that it
54. See generally International Monetary Fund, ..lbout the ~IMF (visited June
15, 2000) <http://www.imf.org/extemallabout.htm> (presenting developments of
the IMF as the following: 1986, established the Structured Adjustment Facility
(SAF); 1987, established the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF);
and, 1993, established the Systematic Transformation Facility (STF)).
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produced ushered in the current era of liberalization. 55 The relative
importance of international financial institutions and governments as
donors increased, and the IMF's policy of conditionality "became a
route to deeper integration. ' 56 While IMF conditionality exerted
pressure on developing countries to liberalize their economic poli-
cies, the debt restructuring effort created the ground floor for modern
"emerging markets" capital account flows by partially restructuring
debt through securitization.
57
These dynamics also affected the international order on the trade
side. The GATT negotiations culminating in the establishment of the
World Trade Organization began in 1986. During the Uruguay
Round of negotiations, leading voices representing the industrialized
and developing worlds moved away from an emphasis on special and
differential treatment towards a stronger commitment to bringing de-
veloping countries fully within GATT discipline. 58 India was one of
the developing-country governments that spearheaded this change in
focus. Some commentators voiced concerns about the relinquishment
of the hard-core fight for "special and differential" provisions in the
Uruguay Round agreements.5 9 Others, however, cautiously endorsed
55. See STEPHEN HAGGARD, DEVELOPING NATIONS AND THE POLITICS OF
GLOBAL INTEGRATION 2 (1995) (defining deep integration as a shift from domestic
policies to international policy coordination). "[T]he willingness of developing
countries to entertain the deep integration agenda can only be understood in light
of the powerful external economic and political constraints that operated on them
during the 1980s." Id. at 6-7.
56. Id. at 95 (noting policy reform as a requirement for bilateral assistance and
lending).
57. See Emerging Markets Traders Association Bulletin (Emerging Mkt. Trade
Ass'n, New York, N.Y.), Oct./Nov./Dec., 1994 (noting how the Brady Plan created
guidelines for the securitization of debt, and how the resulting market in Brady
bonds quickly became a significant aspect of international financial activity).
58. The policy of special and differential treatment has by no means disap-
peared from the system as revised by the Uruguay Round. In the vast majority of
instances in which the principle is invoked in the Uruguay Round Agreements,
however, it is either to acknowledge the principle broadly without establishing
more specific mechanisms for preferential treatment. Where such mechanisms ex-
ist, they serve only to grant developing countries a relatively longer period to im-
plement Uruguay Round rules, rather than to establish a differential standard to be
used in perpetuity.
59. See B.S. Chimni, Political Economy of the Uruguay Round Negotiations: A
Perspective, 29 INT'L STUD. 2, 135, 144 (1992) (suggesting the adoption of the
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the move, arguing that developing countries were better off spending
their energy demanding that industrialized countries finally reform
their own longstanding deviations from GATT discipline in areas of
relative importance to developing countries, such as textiles and ag-
riculture.
III. INDIA AND ITS BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS
TRADE RESTRICTIONS
A. THE TRANSFORMATION OF INDIA
The "duality" that characterizes many developing economies also
marks India's economy. On one hand, India ranks in the top ten of
world economies in terms of aggregate output, and has "one of the
world's largest pools of highly trained technical manpower." 61 On
the other hand, India's stark socioeconomic disparities and its mas-
sive-and massively poor-population have led the United Nations
to rank India in the bottom quarter of the world's nations in terms of
human development. 62
India's attempts to address this poverty have been paradigmatic of
development policy in the international order in the postwar era.
During the 1960s and 1970s, India pursued an inward-looking policy
of development, in which the state played a substantial role in en-
couraging indigenous growth in target industries, both through regu-
lation and direct involvement of state-owned or partially-state-owned
enterprises. 63 Thus, India is a classic example of developing-country
"graduation" concept as a possible strategy for developing countries).
60. See David M. Trubek, Protectionism and Development: Tine jor a New
Dialogue?, 25 N.Y.U. J. INT'L & POL. 345, 364-66 (1993).
61. EIU India, supra note 12, at 16 (examining some positive characteristics of
India's economy).
62. See United Nations Human Dei'elopment Report 1999, Globalization with a
Human Face, U.N. Development Programme, 44th Sess.. at 136 (1999) (ranking
India's "human development index" 132nd out of 174 countries).
63. See EIU India, supra note 12, at 17 (explaining that state planning took the
form of comprehensive "five-year plans" issued by the National Planning Com-
mission); see also id. (observing that state investment as a total of gross domestic
capital formation hovered between forty percent and sixty percent for the public
sector and between fifty percent and sixty percent for the private sector from the
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movement during this period toward "self-reliance because the
country has focused on economic and political objectives that are
grounded in principles of self- determination and anti-imperialism.
64
The Indian textile industry is an even more quintessential example
of this movement. Prior to British rule, India had a thriving indige-
nous textile industry. In moving his country towards political inde-
pendence, Mahatma Gandhi emphasized the ideals of self-reliance
and small-scale production as a way both to wean India from eco-
nomic dependence on the colonial metropole, and to provide a highly
decentralized and accessible means of sustenance and basic poverty
reduction. The handloom became a symbol of this philosophy of
self-reliance. Today, as India's largest industry, the textile industry
provides employment for nearly fifteen million people.
65
After independence, India employed a strong import-substitution
trade policy regime. Trade accounted for less than ten percent of In-
dian GDP, and Indian trade accounted for a fraction of a percent of
world trade. 66 A strong advocate of inward-looking industrialization,
India also acted as a leader in the developing-country government
movement to establish a New International Economic Order.
Like many other developing countries, however, India began
charting a new and quite different course for development in the
early 1990s. In 1991, India embarked on an ambitious liberalization
program. This reform initiative came about for a number of reasons,
including a desire to participate in the "emerging markets" phe-
nomenon and a belief that the limits of inward-looking industrializa-
tion had been reached. More immediately, however, was the need to
resolve a balance-of-payments crisis. Following the spike in oil
prices during the Gulf War, India experienced severe inflation and,
consequently, a massive balance-of-payments crisis that propelled
the Indian government to seek aid from the IMF. In return for emer-
gency aid from the IMF, India entered into the IMF's structural ad-
justment program. 67 Reforms included a new, deregulatory industrial
1960s to the 1990s).
64. See, e.g., id. at 17.
65. See id. at 38.
66. See id. at 52.
67. See id. at 17.
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policy designed to encourage private sector growth. This policy con-
sisted of foreign investment and partial divestiture from state-owned
enterprises, 68 devaluation of the rupee in 1991 and full-current-
account convertibility of the rupee in 1994,69 reductions in public
spending,70 and deregulation of price controls.
71
Trade liberalization was also an important element of India's re-
form. In 1991, India began to liberalize its elaborate regime of quan-
titative restrictions on imports. By 1995, India had fully lifted quan-
titative restrictions on a little over half of its 11,587 tariff lines, and
loosened restrictions on another 1500 lines. At that time, India de-
clared to the WTO Committee on Balance-of-Payments Restrictions
that "virtually all items of capital goods, raw materials, intermediar-
ies, components... and other goods are freely importable. '72 Quan-
titative restrictions on consumer goods such as textiles, however, re-
mained largely in place. India observed that "the import of consumer
items has also been eased in a gradual manner and it is the Govern-
ment['s] intention to steadily carry this process forward."7 3
The Committee on Balance-of-payments Restrictions was unable
to reach a conclusion in 1995 as to whether India's quantitative re-
strictions were justified. Rather, the opinions of the members seemed
to be divided into two camps. One camp supported India's view that
the liberalization of remaining import restrictions required additional
caution, and that the "timing and sequence of the phase-out of quan-
titative restrictions... should be left to the judgment of the Indian
authorities." 74 These members "remarked that while India's external
68. See EIU India, supra note 12, at 19 (noting that the new industrial policy
encouraged foreign investment, for example, by raising the ceiling on foreign eq-
uity holdings in companies based in India to fifty-one percent).
69. See id. at 52.
70. See id. at 49.
7 1. See id. at 25.
72. WTO Committee on Balance-of-Payments Restrictions, Report on the Con-
sultation with India, Annex I, WT/BOP/R/i I (visited June 15, 2000) <http:i/www.
wto.org/search97cgi/s97_cgi> [hereinafter WTO India).
73. Id. Annex 1 (discussing India's gradual increase in imports as being inte-
gral to the development of its economy).
74. Id. para. 7 (asserting that India is entitled to handle its economic reform
internally, "at a pace suited to the country's conditions.").
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position appeared to be stable, the overall balance-of-payments re-
mained structurally weak. ' 75 Members cited India's widening trade
deficit in 1995 as resulting from a combination of factors, including
increased imports, declining exports, and the more general problems
relating to financial liberalization and current capital market condi-
tions. Further, these members concluded that it was not enough to as-
sess the level of reserves based on trade performance alone. Instead,
they asserted that the country should complete structural reforms "in
a manner that was socially and politically sustainable in an economy
the size of India, with a large population and wide income disparities
.... Premature elimination of the remaining restrictive measures
might reverse India's fragile balance-of-payments situation and dis-
rupt the momentum of trade liberalization." 76
Other members were much less sympathetic to India's claim that
the country was implementing quantitative restrictions for balance-
of-payments reasons. These members observed that the widening
trade deficit was the result of "rapid, economic expansion [that] had
triggered growth of imports of capital and intermediate goods .. "
The growth of [these] imports should, in turn, generate expansion of
India's export capacity. ' 77 These members also noted that India had
attracted "large inflows of foreign direct and portfolio investment,
leading to a substantial increase of India's foreign exchange reserves
.... 78 Finally, these members pointed out that, according to the
IMF, India's medium-term balance of payments prospects appeared
sound. Consequently, these members felt that India's continued use
of quantitative restrictions was not justified under Article XVIII.
79
By the time the Committee issued its next report on India in March
of 1997, disagreement over India's maintenance of quantitative re-
strictions had intensified. India argued that their position required
75. Id. para. 6.
76. Id. para. 7 (suggesting that other countries recognize India's delicate posi-
tion and allow it to move towards trade liberalization on its own terms).
77. Id. para. 8.
78. WTO India, supra note 72, para. 8.
79. See id. paras. 8, 11 (noting that India's current account deficit had de-
creased, imports of capital and intermediate goods had grown, and the current lev-
els of reserves were sustainable).
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continued caution, especially given the volatility of the capital mar-
kets. The Committee consulted the IMF, which asserted that, based
on its foreign reserves position, India could no longer justify quanti-
tative restrictions on balance-of-payments grounds s0 The Commit-
tee, however, remained undecided and chose not to make any rec-
ommendations to the General Council.
In May of 1997, India notified the Committee of its plan to re-
move its remaining quantitative restrictions in a three-step, nine-year
phase-out. The Committee did not approve this plan, and in October
of 1997, the United States requested a WTO panel to consider
whether India's regime complied with GATT/WTO law. 81
B. THE WTO BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS CASE
In October of 1997, the United States requested that the WTO
Dispute Settlement Body ("DSB") establish a panel to consider its
claim that quantitative restrictions maintained by India were incon-
sistent with India's obligations under GATT/WTO law.82 India did
not dispute the claim that these restrictions violated Article XI.
Rather, it put forth two defenses, one substantive and one institu-
tional. Both defenses revolved around the GATT/WTO provision for
quantitative restrictions imposed by developing countries for bal-
ance-of-payments reasons.
80. See id. para. 12 (suggesting tariff reductions and -macroeconomic" alter-
natives as a substitute for quantitative restrictions).
81. See generally India-Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural,
Textile and Industrial Products, Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the
United States, WT/DS90/8 (visited June 15, 2000) <http:/www.wto.org/wto,
ddf/ep/search.html> [hereinafter Request for Panel] (discussing the U. S." request
to examine India's quantitative restrictions and its inconsistent practices).
82. See India - Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural, Textile
and Industrial Products, VT/DS90/R, para. 5.122 (visited June 15, 2000)
<http://www.vto.orglwto/ddf/ep/search.html> [hereinafter Panel Report] (identi-
fying the quantitative restrictions as: "(a) discretionary import licensing; (b) ca-
nalization of imports through government agencies; (c) [India's) Special Import
Licensing (SIL)." The Panel upheld the U.S.' claim with respect to all of these
measures. See id. para. 5.144.
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1. The Substantive Arguments
a. India's Substantive Response
Substantively, India responded that GATT Article XVIII allowed
quantitative restrictions as measures "necessary . . . to forestall" a
decrease in the member's monetary reserves, or "to achieve a rea-
sonable rate of increase in its reserves" where those reserves were
inadequate. 83 India argued that its time schedule for the removal of
import restrictions was consistent with Article XVIII: 11, which
states that members shall "progressively relax" quantitative restric-
tions "as conditions improve. ' 84 As further justification, India
pointed to the fact that Article XVIII allows quantitative restrictions
to "forestall the threat of, or to stop, a serious decline in monetary re-
serves," 85 as opposed to "the imminent threat" required by Article
XII. Moreover, India pointed to the interpretive note (the "Ad Note")
to Article XVIII, which states that a member will not be "required to
relax or remove restrictions if such relaxation or removal would
thereupon produce conditions justifying the intensification or institu-
tion" of quantitative restrictions.86
In India's view, the drafters intended Article XVIII: 11 to ensure
that a Member had a right to maintain import restrictions. If their re-
laxation or removal would produce conditions justifying their inten-
sification or reintroduction under Article XVIII:9, this right existed
even without an immediate balance-of-payments need.
Moreover, under the terms of Article XVIII:9, developing-country
Members could introduce, maintain or intensify import restrictions in
order to set their reserves at an adequate level for the implementation
of economic development programs. Consequently, irrespective of
whether import restrictions were currently necessary to address an
existing crisis in its balance-of-payments, India felt entitled to re-
move them gradually within a time-schedule designed to avoid bal-
ance-of-payments difficulties. Otherwise, these difficulties would re-
83. GATT, supra note 21, art. XVIII, sec. B, para. 9.
84. Panel Report, supra note 82, para. 3.168.
85. GATT, supra note 21, art. XVIII, see. B, para. 9(a).
86. See id. art. XVIII, para. 11.
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suit in a serious decline in its monetary reserves, thereby jeopardiz-
ing its program of economic development.
87
b. The United States' Argument
In responding to India's substantive defense, the United States as-
serted that the GATT/WTO intended the balance-of-payments ex-
ception to allow members to employ quantitative restrictions tempo-
rarily, in a "limited set of circumstances." The United States further
asserted that the GATT/WTO "did not provide carte blanche for In-
dia to continue fifty years of protectionist import restrictions, par-
ticularly after the IMF had determined that India [did not face a]
threat of serious decline in its monetary reserves."8 8 The language of
Article XVIII: 11 required that members "progressively relax" quan-
titative restrictions "as conditions improve, maintaining them only to
the extent necessary... and shall eliminate them when conditions no
longer justify such maintenance." 89 According to the United States,
this language required India to eliminate quantitative restrictions im-
mediately when they no longer became necessary.
The United States observed that IMF clearly had stated that India
was not experiencing a serious decline in its monetary reserves, that
there was no threat of such a decline, and that India's monetary re-
serves were not inadequate. Thus, the United States argued that In-
dia's reserve position no longer satisfied the conditions laid out in
Article XVIII:9(a) and (b) or the Ad Note, prohibiting the use of any
balance-of-payments justifications for maintenance of the challenged
measures. Therefore, India was obliged to eliminate immediately the
restrictions in question.
2. The Institutional Arguments
India's institutional defense was twofold. First, India asserted that
the authority to determine compliance with GATT/WTO balance-of-
payments law rested with the Balance-of-Payments Committee and
87. See Panel Report, supra note 82, para. 3.171.
88. Id. para. 3.154 (citing Appellate Body Report on Argentina-Measures Af-
fecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles, Apparel and Other Items, AB-1988-1,
WT/DS56/AB/R, para. 73).
89. GATT, supra note 21, art. XVIII, sec. B, para. 11.
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its consultation process. Second, India argued that the IMF's deter-
minations were not dispositive of the empirical questions concerning
India's monetary reserves situation.
India argued that the Panel did not have the authority to determine
whether its "time-schedule for the removal of import restrictions"
was consistent with Article XVIII. 90 India felt that authority on this
question rested with the Balance-of-Payments Committee and the
General Council, under the consultation proceedings provided for
balance-of-payments issues. GATT/WTO assigned authority in such
a manner because both the Committee and Council were-composed
of only three panelists and with no requirement of political or geogr-
pahical representiveness-open to all member states, developed and
developing alike.91 Thus, if GATT/WTO allowed the Panel to decide
such matters, authority would shift from its assigned designation un-
der the GATT/WTO agreements, disrupting the GATT/WTO frame-
work with "serious systemic implications [for] highly controversial
matters. ' 92 India argued "it would not serve the WTO system well if
balance-of-payments matters, which raised not only technical but
also delicate political matters, were submitted to the rigidities of the
adjudication process. '93 In India's view, then, a member invoking
Article XVIII could "maintain its import restrictions until the Gen-
eral Council, based on a recommendation of the Committee on Bal-
ance-of-Payments Restrictions ... reached [a] 'final decision' and
advised the Member that its import restrictions" were inconsistent
with Article XVIII.94
The United States felt that the WTO DSB had full authority to
consider the question before it. Neither Article XVIII, nor the dispute
settlement provisions of the GATT and WTO agreements prohibited
recourse to dispute settlement. Moreover, there was no indication
from the text or the negotiating history of the 1994 Dispute Settle-
ment Understanding ("DSU") that balance-of-payments matters were
90. Id. para. 3.69.
91. See id. para. 3.80.
92. Id. para. 3.72.
93. See Panel Report, supra note 82, para. 3.72.
94. Id. para. 3.88(ii).
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to be "carved out" of the DSU's jurisdiction. 95
With respect to the Panel's consultations with the IMF, the United
States had asserted that GATT/WTO rules required the Panel to con-
suit with the International Monetary Fund, and to accept "as disposi-
tive" the IMF's determinations as to "whether the facts of India's
balance-of-payments and reserve situation placed India within the
criteria listed in Article XVIII. '' 96 The United States based this argu-
ment on Article XV:2 of the GATT, which provides that in the con-
text of balance of payments problems, contracting parties "shall con-
sult fully with the International Monetary Fund [and] shall accept the
determination of the Fund as to what constitutes a serious decline in
the contracting party's monetary reserves, a very low level of its
monetary reserves, or a reasonable rate of increase in its monetary
reserves." 97
In response, India argued that Article XV did not apply to panel
proceedings but only to consultation proceedings. India also argued
that the IMF's findings could not be accepted as dispositive, or the
IMF would effectively be given the authority to determine "the legal
status of a restriction" under Article XVIII.98
3. The Panel Decision
The Panel ultimately found for the U.S., deciding that Article
XVIII did not justify India's quantitative restrictions. In doing so, the
Panel followed the substantive argument of the U.S., and held that
Article XVIII required India to eliminate its quantitative restrictions
immediately upon a finding that they were no longer necessary. The
Panel also followed the United States' institutional argument that the
DSB had full authority to inquire into the balance-of-payments justi-
fications proffered by member states for their quantitative restric-
tions. Further, the Panel opined that the DSB need not defer to the
more politically representative Committee on Balance-of-Payments
Restrictions and General Council.
95. See Panel Report, supra note 82, para. 5.23; see also id. paras. 3.82-3.87.
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On the institutional question of the proper relationship between the
WTO and the IMF, the Panel declined to "decide the extent to which
Article XV:2 may require panels to consult with the IMF or consider
as dispositive specific determinations of the IMF." 99 In noting that it
had the responsibility of "making an objective assessment of the
facts" and their conformity with the GATT, however, the Panel ac-
cepted "certain assessments of the IMF."' 00
On appeal, India argued that the Panel did not make "an objective
assessment of the facts," but rather "delegated" the responsibility of
doing so to the IMF101 and permitted the opinion of the IMF "to sub-
stitute for its own." 102 The Appellate Body rejected India's argument.
Although the Appellate Body acknowledged that the Panel had given
"considerable weight to the views expressed by the IMF," it con-
cluded that a "careful reading ... makes clear that the Panel did not
simply accept the views of the IMF," but "critically assessed" the
data and compared it with data provided by other sources, such as the
report of the Reserve Bank of India.10 3 The Appellate Body also up-
held the Panel's other conclusions.
IV. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE INDIA -
QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS CASE
A. TRENDS THAT THE CASE EXEMPLIFIES
The India - Quantitative Restrictions case demonstrates both sub-
stantive and institutional trends in contemporary international eco-
nomic law. The substantive approach to the balance-of-payments ex-
99. See Panel Report, supra note 82, para. 5.13.
100. Id.
101. See India - Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural, Textile
and Industrial Products, WT/DS90/AB/R, para. 48 (visited June 15, 2000) <http://
www.wto.org/wto/ddf/ep/search.html> [hereinafter Appellate Report] (arguing that
the Panel must conduct an assessment of the facts itself, unless a specific Dispute
Settlement Procedure indicates otherwise and permits delegation).
102. Id. para. 49 (explaining that the Panel can consult an expert, such as the
IMF, to gather facts and opinion, but that the Panel must analyze the facts on its
own).
103. Id. paras. 149-50.
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ception for developing countries has moved away from recognition
of the genuine and chronic balance-of-payments difficulties facing
developing countries. Instead, this approach has moved to an in-
creasing belief that wayward government policies help create such
problems and that more liberal economic discipline is necessary to
help prevent such difficulties.
With respect to international political relations between industri-
alized and developing countries, the end of the Cold War, the debt
crisis, and the death of the NIEO movement have decreased the rela-
tive bargaining influence of developing-country governments, at
least insofar as they seek policies different from those preferred by
industrialized countries. In terms of GATT culture, many have re-
marked on the way that the Uruguay Round created a movement
away from pragmatism and towards a more adjudicatory, "legalistic"
approach.' 4 Finally, with respect to the international organizational
division of labor, the WTO has recognized the importance of a re-
newed effort to coordinate international trade and monetary law and
policy. 105 The close cooperation between the IMF and the WTO in
the India-Quantitative Restrictions case attests to that effort.
B. CONCERNS ABOUT THESE TRENDS
1. Substantive Concerns
Concerns about the trends surrounding the India - Quantitative
Restrictions case fall under both substantive and institutional head-
ings. Substantively, the primary concern is that developing econo-
mies are not out of the woods yet with respect to chronic balance-of-
payments difficulties. Further, international economic law on this
subject should not forget the human costs these crises exact, and how
difficult it can be for an economy to recover from them."'
104. See, e.g. Kennith W. Abbott, The Many Faces of international Legaliza-
tion, 92 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 57 (1998).
105. See Jackson, supra note 1, at 141-42 (discussing the possibility of greater
interchange between the WTO and the IMF, and the importance of the "monetary-
trade" link in international economic law).
106. See Nicholas D. Kristof & Edward Wyatt, Who Sank, or Swan, in Choppy
Currents of a World Cash Ocean, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 15, 1999; Peter Stein, The
Backlash: In Asia, Victims of Capitalism Are Questioning the Devotion to Free
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India's argument for caution deserves some consideration on this
ground. Although the Panel dismissed it as irrelevant to the time pe-
riod under consideration, the onslaught of the Asian financial crisis
immediately after establishment of the Panel seemed, at least par-
tially, to support India's wariness of full trade and monetary liberali-
zation. Due to the fact that the volatility of portfolio investment in
emerging capital markets remains undisputed, there is a need to rec-
ognize the real challenge to any argument for full capital and current
account liberalization.107 The social and political costs of volatility
warrant reexamination of the argument for caution. 108
2. Institutional Concerns
India argued that it should be given substantial leeway in deter-
mining for itself what balance-of-payments measures were justified.
This argument was based in part on the importance of maintaining
goodwill among WTO members.
There is always a danger of exceptions swallowing the rule, and
the GATT/WTO dispute settlement system has repeatedly stressed
the importance of construing exceptions narrowly to prevent this
from happening. The existence of such a danger, however, should
not prevent careful contextual analysis. In the present case, a signifi-
cant liberalization of India's trade regime, as well as a commitment
to liberalize the remainder, would seem to support the view that India
did not intend to evade WTO discipline, but rather wished for more
autonomy in determining how best to comply with such discipline.
The DSB arguably recently granted such autonomy to the United
States in declining to find the controversial United States statute
known as "Section 301," which authorizes the United States to im-
pose unilateral trade sanctions on WTO members, inconsistent with
the United States obligations under the WTO.'°9
Markets, WALL. ST. J., Setp. 17, 1999, at R22.
107. See Cynthia Lichtenstein, The Mexican Crisis: Who Should Be a Country's
Lender of Last Resort?, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1769, 1744 (1995) (observing that
primary "hot money" danger lies in portfolio markets).
108. See generally Timothy A. Canova, Banking and Financial Reform at the
Crossroads of the Neoliberal Contagion, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1571, 1597-98
(1999) (describing the contagious effect of a Mexican financial collapse).




The India - Quantitative Restrictions case exemplifies both laud-
able and troubling developments in today's international order. On
one hand, the order has gained considerable authority and coherence,
as exemplified by both the WTO DSB's willingness to scrutinize In-
dia's quantitative restrictions regime, and by its close coordination
with the IMF. On the other hand, the GATTiWTO should not em-
ploy these efforts to pursue an unduly narrow and rigid understand-
ing of the goals of the international economic order. The rejection of
India's balance-of-payments defense in this case exemplifies an ar-
guably shortsighted dismissal, particularly in view of the crises that
wracked Asia shortly after the case began, the continuing balance-of-
payments difficulties faced by many developing countries, and the
uncertainty with which developing countries are able to progress. In
formulating a more cohesive policy on balance-of-payments meas-
ures, as the India - Quantitative Restrictions case seeks to do, the in-
ternational trade and monetary regimes of the WTO and the IMF
should more fully take into account the "special and differential"
challenges developing countries face in conducting economic policy.
A refusal to do so may exact both economic and political costs from
the viability and legitimacy of the new international order.
of 1974, Dec. 22, 1999, WT/DS152/R. para. 8.1 (finding that the United States
statute is not inconsistent with United States obligations under the WTO "'based in
full or part on the US Administration's undertakings" to comply with its \VTO ob-
ligations). It is impossible that these two panel decisions can be distinguished on
the grounds that the Panel found in the Section 301 case that an otherwise WTO-
inconsistent statute was rendered consistent through implementation, whereas in
the India-Quantitative Restrictions case the Panel found that India's implementa-
tion was WTO-consistent. A full comparison of these two decisions is beyond the
scope of this article.
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